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Research Summary:  
This comparative historical analysis demonstrates how memory and reflexive 
interpretations of the past can shape entrepreneurial willingness to collaborate with 
larger firms in an industry. Emphasizing the importance of spatial metaphors and 
periodization for developing historical knowledge, the paper focuses on how the 
historical space of experience explains how entrepreneurs make strategic choices 
regarding collaboration under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. Comparing 
the U.S. and U.K. emerging poultry sectors offers a methodologically novel analysis 
of an important but little-studied agribusiness sector, offering a dual reading that 
compares two versions of historical reasoning both theoretically and empirically. 
 
Managerial Summary: 
Historical experience matters to entrepreneurs, shaping their expectations about 
markets and opportunities, including possibilities for strategic alliances with larger 
firms. Rather than assuming that the events of the past structurally determine 
entrepreneurial expectations for the future, we demonstrate how experience, 
interpretation, and memory shape the nature of competition and collaboration in 
emerging industries. Our approach relies on the comparative method, suggesting a 
new way to consider how uses of the past might shape entrepreneurship in 






History matters to entrepreneurs. Historical experience shapes their expectations 
about markets and opportunities (Popp and Holt, 2013; Wadhwani and Jones, 2014; 
Welter and Gartner, 2016). In moving from expectation to exploitation, 
entrepreneurs are typically constrained by significant resource gaps (Teng, 2007), 
and access to essential complementary resources often comes through strategic 
alliances. Yet scholars know little about whether or how history influences the 
propensity of entrepreneurs to develop or reject such partnerships. 
 
Our research question is to explore whether and how historical experience impacts 
entrepreneurs’ pursuit of strategic alliances. A lack of consensus among 
entrepreneurship scholars on how to explain the success or failure of strategic 
alliances suggests the need for more contextual analyses, including historical 
approaches. Yet recent research in strategic management has exposed the need for 
careful consideration of how history serves as both a structuring and a sensemaking 
element of strategy (Foster et al., 2017; Hatch and Schultz, 2017; Rowlinson, Hassard, 
and Decker, 2014; Suddaby, Foster, and Trank, 2010). For entrepreneurs, as with 
other organizational actors, the past is not an inert given but an experience, the 
interpretation of which shapes the present and sets expectations for the future 
(Wadhwani et al., 2018). How entrepreneurs perceive historical time thus becomes 
crucial for understanding the impact of the past on expectations for the present and 




We propose two constructs—structure and space of experience—and argue that 
differences in their temporal dimensions can provide divergent explanations for 
entrepreneurial behavior. In doing so, we build upon Koselleck’s (2004: 235) 
proposition that “time, as it is known, can only be expressed in spatial metaphors.” 
What makes strategic sense in one spatial metaphor may not make sense in the 
other. As we demonstrate below, the structural historical approach most often 
deployed in strategy and entrepreneurship studies does not always explain why 
entrepreneurs make the choices they do. Uniting Koselleck’s spatial metaphors for 
time with existing research in strategic uses of history, we call for increased attention 
to the ways in which entrepreneurs constitutively experience historical time (Kirsch, 
Moeen, and Wadhwani, 2014; Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016a; Suddaby and Foster, 
2017; Vaara and Lamberg, 2016; Wadhwani, 2016a). 
 
We articulate our argument by drawing on tools familiar to historians but 
uncommon in entrepreneurship studies: comparative history and periodization. We 
explain how attention to entrepreneurs’ spaces of experience solves a puzzle, 
presented in a comparative case study, which is not fully answerable by a structural 
understanding of change over time. The case study explores the emergence and 
rapid growth of the modern poultry sector in the U.S. and the U.K. from 1920 to 
1990, highlighting the similarities in technology and market structures in both 
national settings, but revealing a crucial difference in entrepreneurs’ approaches to 
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alliance formation. Different expectations, conditioned not by structures of the past 
but by interpreted experiences of the past, led to divergent approaches to alliances 
for the two groups of entrepreneurs. 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND ENTREPRENEURIAL COLLABORATION  
Alliances present partners with opportunities to benefit from complementary assets. 
The potential benefits are particularly acute in those settings with the greatest 
uncertainty—for instance, where entrepreneurial judgment is most required, or 
where technological change is rapid and the need to innovate is greatest (Godley, 
2013; Godley and Casson, 2015; Jiang et al., 2016; Rothermael, 2001; Teng, 2007). 
Despite this strong incentive to cooperate, most alliances fail (Doz, 1996; Doz and 
Hamel 1998; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Madhok, 2002; Milanov and 
Shepherd, 2013; Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison, 2001).  
 
There is currently no consensus within the literature to explain why smaller 
entrepreneurial firms find alliance-based performance improvements to be elusive. 
One explanation of the high failure rates is that alliances with large firms leave small 
firms vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 
2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Lu and Beamish, 2006). Ariño, Ragozzino, 
and Reuer (2008), however, suggest that SMEs’ reduced managerial capabilities 
rather than large firm opportunism better explains the failure of such alliances.  
Moreover, evidence that cooperative settings are essential preconditions for alliances 
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to be successful is mixed. Some alliances are successful in non-cooperative settings, a 
result which questions the behavioral assumptions of alliance success (Kumar, 2010; 
Li et al., 2017; Shakeri and Radfar, 2017, Zhang et al., 2010). 
 
Researchers trying to grapple with these sometimes contradictory results have 
suggested the need for more contextual analyses of entrepreneurs’ strategic 
alliances, including longitudinal studies (Ariño et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2016, Welter, 
2011). In an important recent contribution, Li, et al. (2017: 47) suggest that 
researchers should distinguish between the ‘behavioral and affective dimensions of 
an alliance relationship,’ where the behavioral component describes partners’ joint 
activities to accomplish tasks, whereas the affective dimension describes how the 
partners are bonded together through formal and informal links. Their survey 
results suggest that moderate levels of bonding between alliance partners support 
performance (Li et al., 2017). Yet it remains to be shown how historical experience 
might shape the context of affective bonding in alliances. Differing understandings 
of the past can produce divergent strategic responses to the business environment 
under conditions of complexity and uncertainty (Casson and Godley, 2005). 
  
STRUCTURE AND EXPLANATION 
There are multiple forms of historical knowledge which shape entrepreneurial 
strategies, although only a few have so far merited attention in entrepreneurship 
studies. Koselleck (2004) insists that historical knowledge can only be conveyed 
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using spatial metaphors, for although chronological time proceeds linearly, human 
understandings of change over time are always contested, contingent, and multi-
layered. One spatial metaphor for the relationship between history, strategy, and 
entrepreneurship is structure. As a spatial metaphor for historical time, structure 
suggests that the past is composed of discrete components or building blocks—
events—which can then be assembled into a linear, coherent history with defined 
contours. Thus as a spatial metaphor, structure proves especially useful for 
producing causal models for explaining change over time in linear terms. 
 
For instance, patterns of integration within industries might be better explained 
using structural metaphors of change over time than by static approaches that define 
the boundaries of firms and markets solely in terms of transaction costs (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2005; Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides and Winter, 2005). Such approaches to 
industry architecture acknowledge the importance of change over time, but place a 
strong emphasis on the structural constraints that time’s passage imposes on 
individuals and firms (Argyres and Bigelow, 2009; Fixson and Park, 2008; Jacobides, 
2005; Pisano and Teece, 2007). Structure as a mode of historical understanding thus 
intentionally minimizes individual agency, seeking instead “higher-level causal 
forces that cannot be understood simply by looking at the level of individual agents" 




The explanatory power of structural metaphors for historical time has proven 
strongest in evolutionary theory, path-dependency theory, and life-cycle theory 
(Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; David, 1992; Jack, Dodd, 
and Anderson, 2008). Yet with explanatory elegance comes the high cost of 
determinism. Constructing a linear history of an industry requires minimizing the 
agency of individuals and the contexts in which individual choices were made—
including the prehistories of the people, firms, industries, and markets that may 
have influenced the paths eventually followed (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Sydow, 
Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009; Welter, 2011). Strong forms of evolutionary theory, for 
instance, demand a rejection of individuals exercising “prescient intentional action” 
to explain how organizations adapt to environments (Murmann, 2013: 59). For social 
scientists seeking to explain why an organization or industry has its present-day 
architecture, the causal mechanisms inherent to evolutionary, path-dependency, and 
life-cycle theory are useful modes of analysis that bear predictive weight. Yet the 
individuals who actually experienced the historical changes thus being explained 
might be surprised to learn that their actions had neither prescience nor 
intentionality. 
 
SPACE OF EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING 
An alternative spatial metaphor suggested by Koselleck (2004) is space of experience. 
Social scientists seeking clarity and elegance of explanation will not be likely to find 
comfort in the word space, which carries a dizzying array of connotations—including 
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a period of time, a delimited physical area, a portion of a page of text, or a vast 
emptiness (OED Online, 2017). Yet for Koselleck the concept of the space of 
experience is useful as a metaphor for historical time precisely because of its 
imprecision, as an emptiness that is filled by the lived “experiences and expectations 
of active human agents,” (2004: 231) with its outlines or delimiters put in place only 
through ongoing acts of interpretation of past events. By rejecting linear history we 
gain a richer understanding of how entrepreneurs faced the contingent, uncertain 
contexts of lived experience, and thus can come closer to understanding how those 
contexts shaped their ongoing strategic decisions (Anderson, Dodd, and Jack, 2012; 
Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Kirsch et al., 2014; Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016a; 
Moroz and Hindle, 2011; Suarez, Grodal, and Gotsopoulos, 2015).  
 
Imprinting theory and extended evolutionary theory have gained some traction in 
strategy and entrepreneurship literatures as modes of historical analysis that align 
with some aspects of the space of experience approach. Imprinting theory, first 
developed by Stinchcombe (1965) in application to organizations, has been shown to 
be useful for understanding how the early phases of organizational or industry 
development can have lasting, yet not necessarily deterministic, consequences over 
the long term (Johnson, 2007; Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016b; Marquis, 2003; Marquis 
and Tilcsik, 2013; Simsek, Fox, and Heavey, 2015). Extended evolutionary theory, 
alongside imprinting theory, seeks to allow for entrepreneurial agency in history—
both in the past, when making initial choices that may have long-term consequences, 
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and in the present, when interpretations of past events may take on new meanings 
for shaping future decisions (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Aldrich and Yang, 2012; Forbes 
and Kirsch, 2011; Lippmann and Aldrich, 2014). In such views of entrepreneurial 
history, time is not linear but is instead like a set of punctuation marks, with the 
relationship between separate events not necessarily causal, and with each 
individual event potentially laden with significance and meaning (Dew, 2009). 
 
Recent work in strategic management and organizational studies suggests the need 
for more work on how the space of experience can have significant consequences for 
firms and industries. History, as a conscious means of knowing rather than a passive 
accretion of past events, becomes a socially constitutive aspect of organizational 
behaviour (Suddaby, 2016; Wadhwani and Bucheli, 2014). Interpreting the past can 
enable managers to develop a coherent organizational identity, gain legitimacy in an 
emergent industry, and influence how organizational actors perceive strategic 
change (Anteby and Molnar, 2012; Dalpiaz and Di Stefano, 2017; Foster et al., 2017; 
Hatch and Schultz, 2017; Kirsch, 2000; Suddaby et al., 2010; Suddaby and Foster, 
2017; Vaara, Sonenshein, and Boje, 2016; Zundel, Holt, and Popp, 2016). Yet despite 
rapid advances in empirical and theoretical research in strategic uses of the past, 
organizational scholars have not yet incorporated the full range of historical 
methods (Wadwhani et al., 2018). Periodization and comparative analysis in 




PERIODIZATION AS STRATEGIC TEMPORAL STRUCTURING 
Marking out such distinctions between these two spatial metaphors suggests 
incommensurability, as if deductive, structural explanations cannot coexist with 
inductive, interpretive narrations of change over time (Ankersmit, 1994). Yet history 
is widely expected to offer both explanation and interpretation. Although rarely 
explicated, historians use periodization as a tool to draw out the insights from both 
structural and experiential spatial metaphors (Blix, 2006; Fear, 2014; Zerubavel, 
2004). Periodization can be defined as “the interpretive process by which 
developments in the past are organized into coherent periods, eras, or epochs” 
(Wadhwani, 2016a: 69). Periodization should be understood as a specific form of 
what Orlikowski and Yates (2002) call temporal structuring: an approach to time that 
acknowledges the active roles people play in deciding how time works in their lives, 
yet places those actions within structural constraints that remain outside individual 
control. Temporal structuring thus refuses to accept that experienced time is either 
purely a deterministic phenomenon or solely a socially constructed perception; it is 
instead “both the medium and the outcome of people’s recurrent practices” 
(Orlikowski and Yates, 2002: 685).  
 
Periodization, as a subset of temporal structuring, is an essential tool for 
transforming the past into history, simultaneously explaining structural 
transformations over time and interpreting the meaning of those changes. One mode 
of periodization used regularly in the social sciences is temporal bracketing, a 
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heuristic device for segmenting the flow of time into comparable units, built on an 
assumption that individuals’ actions are simultaneously constrained by and 
constitutive of structures over time (Langley, 1999). Periodization is thus 
distinguished from the constant flow of chronological time by its insistence on the 
social construction of time (Rowlinson et al., 2014). Importantly, periodization is 
practiced not only by observers of the past (historians) but also by participants, such 
as by entrepreneurs drawing on previous experience to reduce uncertainty in the 
present (Wadhwani, 2016a). Understanding periodization as a subset of temporal 
structuring allows such insights to be integrated with findings in the organizational 
identity literature that highlight how the ongoing processes of actively interpreting 
the past interact dynamically with the structural conditions of the present (Chreim, 
2005; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006; Whetten, 2006).   
 
THE COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL METHOD AND DATA 
Returning to the research question, we explore whether experiential historical 
memory might offer a means of explaining differences in entrepreneurs’ willingness 
to partner with larger firms. We focus on a comparative case study, the emerging 
poultry sectors in the U.S. and U.K. from 1920 to 1990. In both locations, poultry 
entrepreneurs’ access to the market was governed by much larger, established firms: 
supermarkets. The two geographically separated sets of poultry entrepreneurs 
operated within broadly similar contexts in terms of technological change, 
competitive conditions, and market structures. Despite this similarity, one set of 
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entrepreneurs embraced alliances with large supermarkets, while the other set did 
not.  
 
We explore this question using the comparative historical method. The comparative 
method has a long lineage in economic and business history and historical sociology. 
Many of the paradigm-defining contributions to each discipline have emerged from 
studies using the comparative method. Douglass North’s framing of the significance 
of institutions such as property rights and the influence of informal constraints 
emerged from a deep historical comparison of long-distance trading practices in 
England and Spain (North and Thomas, 1973). Alfred Chandler demonstrated the 
significance of professional management in his defining contribution to business 
history from a comparison of the largest 200 firms in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and 
Japan (Chandler, 1990). But there are important criticisms of the comparative 
historical method when it has been applied to large-scale, complex social systems 
(Mahoney, 2003). 
 
The ideal-type of qualitative comparative research would share many similarities to 
quantitative comparative experimental methodologies, for example those used by 
medical researchers in randomized control drug trials. This approach is 
fundamentally positivist, establishing the dimensions of similarity within the case 
and, using the principle of causal inference, draws suitable conclusions from the 
observed differences. It requires large numbers of observations and properly 
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controlling for all other potential moderating influences. Historians, by contrast, 
incorporate both realist and interpretivist approaches into their comparative method 
(Vaara and Lamberg, 2016). This is partly because historical data, whether archival, 
secondary, or from oral history sources, are almost always incomplete and biased in 
some way. But it is also because of the impossibility of genuinely controlling for all 
the potential moderating factors in comparative historical studies of complex social 
situations (Mahoney 2003).   
 
Data problems can partly be overcome through deep immersion in the sources, the 
triangulation of the different sources, and the explicit recognition of the veracity of 
some sources being greater than others (Kipping, Wadhwani, and Bucheli, 2014; 
Wadhwani, 2016b; Zundel, Holt, and Popp, 2016). Experiment design is significantly 
improved when differences in the contextual settings are “controlled for” by 
minimizing the differences as much as possible in order to compensate for the 
inability to select true “control populations.” An example of this more recent 
controlled comparative historical method is Godley’s comparison of Jewish 
immigrant entrepreneurs in New York and London between 1880 and 1914 and their 
change in entrepreneurial behavior in the two locations as they adopted American 
and British cultural values (Godley, 2001). But despite attention to experiment 
design, this study was unable to control for all the potential moderating factors 
relevant to Jewish immigrant cultural assimilation, and so still transposed between 
interpretivist and realist approaches in its conclusions, albeit more carefully than 
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business historians had done previously. This combination of both realist and 
interpretivist epistemologies within the comparative historical method is rarely 
explicated by historians. But, once stated, it suggests that this is an unusual yet 
potentially quite fruitful approach for entrepreneurship and organizational scholars 
to embrace (Vaara and Lamberg, 2016). We deploy this epistemological aspect of the 
comparative method below by explicitly contrasting two different approaches to 
historical knowledge, structural and space-of-experience. 
 
The specific population selected for comparison in this article is the population of 
entrepreneurs in the poultry industries in the U.S. and the U.K. Our dataset includes 
a wide range of archival documents, government records, price and market data, 
and secondary historical works, which we use to map out the similarities and 
differences in the structure of the two industries. To explore the space of experience 
of the entrepreneurial groups, we rely on a rich set of oral histories. The experiences 
of U.K. poultry entrepreneurs were recounted in a series of ten oral history 
interviews undertaken in 2006 and 2010 by Andrew Godley, which have been 
deposited with the British Library Sound Archive. The experiences of U.S. poultry 
entrepreneurs were gathered by oral history researchers in the late 1980s; one set of 
40 interviews was transcribed and deposited at the Shiloh Museum of Ozark History 
in Springdale, Arkansas, while another set of 23 interviews is held at the Richard P. 
Russell Library in Athens, Georgia. These oral histories, because of their inherent 
subjectivity, provide valuable insights into how individual and collective memories 
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shaped, and were shaped by, entrepreneurial choices made in the past; they 
“breathe life into history” (Thompson, 2017: 14). Where appropriate we also draw on 
documents generated earlier in the twentieth century, such as legislative testimony, 
speeches, and letters and notes in trade journals, illustrating that later recollections 
of events were rooted in documented historical experience.  
 
FINDINGS 
The structure of the U.S. and U.K. poultry industries, 1920-1990 
Chicken, eaten only rarely in America in the early twentieth century, was by the 
1960s one of the country’s most commonly consumed meats. Innovations in genetics 
and breeding, animal nutrition and protein science, and intensive confined rearing 
techniques after World War II enabled U.S. production of chickens to increase 
fourfold between 1945 and 1955 (Boyd, 2001; Corley and Godley, 2011; Horowitz, 
2005;  Striffler, 2005). Poultry entrepreneurs sensed opportunities for reorganization 
and consolidation, with animal feed and hatchery firms integrating forward into 
chicken rearing and processor-distributors integrating backwards through contract 
growing (Gisolfi, 2006; Striffler, 2005). 
 
The British poultry industry likewise only took off after World War II. Total 
commercial production of poultry reared for meat grew from five million birds in 
1953, to ten million in 1956, to 100 million in 1961, and to 202 million by 1967 (Hunt 
and Clark, 1967; National Union of Agricultural Workers, 1961; Sykes, 1956). 
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Industry concentration increased with rapid efficiency gains, which allowed prices 
to fall, in contrast to rising prices among red meats (Hunt and Clark, 1967). As prices 
fell, demand soared. While British per capita meat consumption overall was static 
after 1953, the poultry share rose from one percent in 1955 to one quarter by 1990, 
similar to poultry’s 30 percent share of meat consumption in the U.S.  
 
The industry structures of the American and British poultry sectors followed 
remarkably similar trajectories as they emerged. The chronologies followed in the 
two national settings were not identical. But we are here more concerned with 
following the causal outlines of industry events in relation to market conditions and 
opportunities. So we have adopted a temporal bracketing approach, which permits 
the constitution of comparative units of analysis for the exploration and replication 
of theoretical ideas (Giddens, 1984; Langley, 1999). Despite the two industries 
emerging at different dates, our adoption of the temporal bracketing approach 
enables a comparison as the two industries followed largely similar trajectories.  
Year 1 in the U.S. industry’s trajectory is 1946, and in the U.K. 1956. Here Year 1 
marks not the pre-emergent beginnings of the industry but the start of significant 
integration. In the U.S., full embrace of integration began only after the first modern 
coccidiostats enabled indoor rearing at scale for the first time (Roy, 1966). In the 
U.K., the continuation of wartime rationing of animal feed put a brake on integration 
until after 1954. The first full year after the derationing of animal feed was 1956. 
Obviously there is some arbitrariness in choosing 1946 and 1956 as starting points 
DIFFERENT EXPECTATIONS 
 17 
for emergence, but this is outweighed by the usefulness of exposing the broad 
similarities and key differences in the two industries that follows from the temporal 
bracketing approach. 
 
As shown in figures 1 and 2, broiler industry growth in output was faster in the U.S 
than in the U.K. in the emergent period spanning the first 15 years. This is not 
surprising given the bigger size of the U.S. market. Both industries, however, 
experienced similar price declines during their emergent periods. Concentration in 
the two countries’ broiler industries likewise followed broadly similar patterns (see 
table 1), with both industries initially populated by many hundreds of independent, 
small producers then consolidating rapidly. Notably, the extent of concentration was 
markedly higher in the U.K. 
 
{INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 and TABLE 1 HERE} 
 
In both countries, the periods of intensive industry consolidation coincided with the 
rise of large supermarket chains as the predominant buyers of broilers. In the late 
1940s, the leading U.S. food retailer, A&P, sponsored a “Chicken of Tomorrow” 
contest to encourage technological innovations in broiler mass production 
(Hamilton, 2018; Horowitz, 2004). In the postwar U.K., leading retailers likewise 
expected growing consumer demand for chicken. Alan Sainsbury, head of the 
eponymous food retailer, had already developed its British meat and dairy supply 
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lines, especially through a longstanding trading relationship with Lloyd Maunder, a 
supplier based in Devon. This relationship precipitated a transformation of rearing 
in Devon as Lloyd Maunder incorporated U.S. technologies (Godley and Williams, 
2009).  
 
U.K. retailers, like Sainsbury’s, formed alliances with entrepreneurial poultry 
producers because of one important consequence of the drive to expand rearing. 
Economies of scale meant flocks grew from the hundreds to the tens of thousands, 
and the retailers became increasingly agitated over supply fluctuations and price 
volatility. The U.S. industry was plagued by periods of glut, before price falls 
subsequently led to farmers and processors exiting and so to periods of undersupply 
(House Committee on Small Business, 1957). But through their strategic alliances 
within their supply chain, retailers in Britain were able to co-ordinate poultry 
production cycles to an extent that was unimagined in the U.S. British retailers 
depended on “regularity in supplies, … steady prices to the consumer … [and] 
consistency in quality” to market the novel product, claimed Sainsbury’s Max Justice 
in his keynote to the inaugural broiler conference (Poultry Farmer, 1955). 
 
By contrast, large American supermarket chains pursued cheap chicken through the 
exercise of market power, not collaboration with specific producers. Retail buyers 
purchased chickens on regional spot markets, pitting producers in one region 
against another in a constant push to drive down prices (House Committee on Small 
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Business, 1957). With U.S. supermarkets operating at arms’ length, coordination of 
the chicken supply chain in the 1950s and 1960s fell instead to the “integrators”—
feed dealers like Ralston-Purina and Jesse Jewell in Georgia and processor-
distributors like Tyson in Arkansas or Perdue in Delmarva (Hamilton, 2018). 
 
Although the nature of the relationship between suppliers and buyers differed in the 
two countries, the structure of retailer concentration was remarkably similar in the 
first fifteen years of broiler industry emergence. Over the emergent period the 
market share of the four largest supermarket chains in the U.S. remained steady 
within a range of 20.0% to 21.7% in the years 1948 to 1963 (Joint Economic 
Committee, 1977). In the U.K., market share of the top five supermarkets increased 
from less than 10% in 1956, to over 10% in 1965, then to over 17% by 1971 (Bevan, 
2005, p. 242). The two leading firms in the U.S., A&P and Safeway, combined held 
16.5% market share a decade after the broiler industry began significant integration 
(Mueller and Garoian, 1961), while in the U.K. Sainsbury and Tesco together held 
10% share in 1965 and 13% in 1971 (nine and fifteen years respectively after the 
emergent period began) (Bevan, 2005, p. 242). 
 
Despite these similarities in markets, technology, and industry structure in the two 
nations, there was one significant difference. In the U.S., poultry entrepreneurs 
shunned close collaboration with mass retailers, while in the U.K. the opposite 
occurred. By the 1980s, when both industries had matured beyond their emergent 
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periods, this significant divergence in industry architecture had only grown. In the 
U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, poultry firms created by entrepreneurs decades earlier, 
including Tyson Foods and Perdue Farms, effectively displaced mass retailers as the 
dominant players in the industry. By 1980, 50 percent of chicken bought in U.S. 
supermarkets carried a brand name, and that name in almost all cases was that of a 
processor-integrator, not a supermarket (Striffler, 2005). By contrast, in the U.K. by 
1980 the leading six supermarkets dominated food supply, enjoying a 70 percent 
market share overall, even higher in poultry. Almost all of this was sold through the 
retailers’ own brands by 1980, with few producer brands able to survive. Over sixty 
percent of this poultry meat was nevertheless supplied by the leading ten firms, all 
bar one of which had been among the poultry industry’s pioneers of the late 1950s. 
The structure of the two countries’ poultry sectors therefore followed remarkably 
similar trajectories over their respective emergent phases. There were small 
differences – the U.K. sector became a little more concentrated, the U.S. industry 
faced a slightly more concentrated food retail sector. But the major difference was 
not in structure but behavior. In the U.K. the leading poultry industry entrepreneurs 
capitalized on the strength of their strategic alliances with the leading retailers. In 
the U.S. they did not. 
 
The space of experience of U.S. and U.K. poultry entrepreneurs, 1920-1990 
The preceding section relied on statistics and temporal bracketing to outline the 
broadly similar structures of the U.S. and U.K. poultry industries. We turn now to 
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the space of experience of the entrepreneurs who helped build those industries, 
using oral histories to examine how entrepreneurs thought about and remembered 
the strategic actions they undertook as the industry emerged, grew, and matured. 
 
In American poultry there are three widely remembered founding narratives of the 
pre-emergence stage of the industry, all characterized by disaster and serendipity. In 
1923, Cecile Steele of Delaware, who usually ordered 50 chicks to raise as egg-laying 
hens, accidentally ordered 500, a misfortune to which she responded by raising the 
chickens to sell for meat, supposedly singlehandedly launching the Delmarva broiler 
industry (Williams, 1998). John Tyson likewise attributed the emergence of the 
Arkansas poultry industry to sheer accident, claiming that his produce truck ran out 
of fuel near Springdale in 1936. Forced to rethink his business, he began hauling 
plentiful local poultry to distant cities (Tyson, 1987, p. 56). A tornado destroyed 
much of Gainesville, Georgia, in April 1936, an event that supposedly pushed Jesse 
Jewell to provide both feed and chicks on credit to wiped-out farmers, accidentally 
initiating an integrated model for debt-financed poultry production (Hudgins, 1964). 
In all of these founding narratives—which regionally took on the significance of 
myth in the 1940s, actively remembered into at least the 1980s—the theme of trauma, 
crisis, or devastation being overcome by entrepreneurial vision offered a means of 





Hard times, not statistics of steady growth in markets, emerge most clearly in 
collective memories of early participants in the U.S. poultry industry. The space of 
experience of the interwar farm crisis that racked places such as the upcountry South 
and the Delmarva peninsula in the 1920s and 1930s shaped a perception that the 
range of choices was very limited for most participants in the poultry marketplace. 
In Northwest Arkansas, memories of the collapse of both row cropping and orchard 
production in the 1920s and 1930s remained vivid. One entrepreneur interviewed in 
1987 remembered that his neighbors “were willing to do most anything to make a 
living” (Lemley, 1987: 92). Another remembered responding to the demise of the 
Arkansas apple industry by using his “fruit trees for firewood to heat the chicken 
[shed]s with” (Ritter, 1987: 233). The broiler takeoff opened a path out of poverty for 
many at a time when “there was not much else to do in the dust bowl days” (Ritter, 
1987: 275). Memories of poverty, desperation, and powerlessness were so deeply 
imprinted on the first generation of poultry pioneers that even during the 
comparatively good times of the 1950s, fatalism and mistrust permeated their 
understanding of how the market was structured (Brooks, 1987).  
 
Such founding narratives shaped the responses of poultry entrepreneurs to the 
1950s-60s period of growth and consolidation in the U.S. poultry industry. By the 
1950s, the contract system pioneered by Jesse Jewell in Georgia became the norm 
throughout the industry, enabling the rapid adoption of technological 
breakthroughs in intensive rearing. The feed conversion ratio of U.S. chickens 
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dropped from 2.9 to 2.1 between 1955 and 1975, while the number of days required 
to reach market weight declined from 73 to 56 in the same period (Boyd, 2001). Yet 
the original purpose of contracting was not technological innovation but a forced 
response to market uncertainty, as Don Tyson (John’s son and successor) recalled: 
We had tremendous market swings in those days [the 1950s]. And the thing 
that involved this industry was that at the beginning the individual farmer 
was responsible for the feed and chickens and then as the market swings got 
rougher and rougher, the ups were alright but the farmer couldn't stand the 
down ones. So the feed dealer, feed manufacturer, the hatchery guy started 
softening the downs. Well, to do that [the integrator] had to take some of the 
ups and well, we had, we got into what we call contract farming. (Tyson, 
1987)  
Those integrators who were able to grow large enough to “take some of the ups” 
while weathering periods of overproduction did not understand their relationship 
with chain retailers to be a close partnership. Indeed, supermarket buyers come 
across in the space of experience of poultry entrepreneurs as near-adversaries. Jesse 
Jewell, called before Congress in 1957 to testify on the causes of turmoil in poultry 
prices, pointed out that in any given week A&P might order “250 truckloads” of 
chickens—but because it could purchase from any number of integrators in 
Connecticut, Delmarva, Georgia, or Arkansas, the supermarket chain effectively 
played the integrators off each other. “They [supermarket chain buyers] dictate to 
us,” Jewell told the congressional committee. “It is a buyer’s market, and they dictate 
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to us when the shoe is on their foot, and they do the kicking, and when it is our 
market we do the kicking” (House Committee on Small Business, 1957: 225).  
 
U.K. poultry entrepreneurs, like their American counterparts, remembered the pre-
emergence stage of their industry as a time of overcoming crisis, but in the British 
case that crisis was existential. The prospect of the German blockade during World 
War II was a genuine threat to the survival of the U.K., such was its dependence on 
imported food (Brassley, 2012). Policymakers introduced stringent food rationing to 
temper consumer demand, and imposed compulsory collaboration among 
producers and retailers to improve coordination and control. One of the individuals 
who oversaw wartime food policy was Alan Sainsbury, who served on several key 
Ministry of Food committees, helped introduce the rationing system, and oversaw 
the move to a collaborative supply system among private-sector producers (Butler, 
1998).  
 
Alan Sainsbury sought to adapt wartime compulsory co-operative behavior to the 
competitive markets of the mid-1950s. John Maunder (of Lloyd Maunder) recalled 
being summoned to Sainsbury’s headquarters in London in 1956 along with a few 
other pioneer poultry producers (Godley and Williams, 2009), and being told: 
[W]e’re going to organise the country into sectors. And Maunder, you can 
have the West Country, and Antony Fisher [Managing Director of Buxted 
Chicken, the market leader] you can have the South-east, … And we just sat 
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there and took this. This was marching orders. We were basically told ‘Go 
home and organise it.’ And that’s what – we had nothing more than that. We 
literally had to go back and organise it. 
Maunder, Buxted, and the other selected processors then recruited farmers to supply 
them. It was not straightforward, but the system spread: 
[Y]ou had to go out and literally persuade farmers to invest in chicken 
houses, at a time when it was a relatively unknown and unproven thing. It 
gathered momentum, of course, in a matter of a strikingly short period of 
time – only a couple of years. It really gathered momentum, and people 
started to talk…. But in those early stages it was very strange. And to get a 
farmer to actually understand the fact that he had to do, he had to put these 
day-old chicks in when we wanted them put in, because it had to be on a 
programmed output style. 
 
The network of alliance partners guaranteed revenues to its insider-entrepreneurs. It 
was a system that constrained competitive forces, and so privileged insiders, but at 
the enormous benefit of smoothing the returns to capital investment in new facilities, 
in what was a highly volatile trade (Sykes, 1963, pp. 12, 30-4).  
 
In both national contexts, the pre-emergence stage was one of crisis and great 
uncertainty. The responses of the different populations to those crises were similarly 
remembered in triumphant terms, yet key to the U.S. experience was a memory of 
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individualistic heroism, whereas in the U.K. memories centered on shared 
responsibilities for confronting the wartime crisis. In the emergent stage of the U.S. 
industry, entrepreneurs continued to make sense of their industry as one with few 
options other than scaling up production and driving down prices to gain entry to 
national markets. In the U.K. emergent stage, by contrast, entrepreneurs 
remembered collaborating with retailers to gain the trust of skeptical consumers by 
producing stable supplies of quality meat. The divergent historical understandings 
of the relationship between poultry entrepreneurs and major retailers continued 
through the growth and stability stages, as the collective memories of the two 
industries’ early stages influenced expectations and so reinforced the two divergent 
patterns of behavior in otherwise very similar structural settings. 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
A structural approach to history seeks to lay out a linear set of developments, with 
each stage in the process causally linked to that which follows. A structural 
periodization thus emphasizes how entrepreneurs, even as they make strategic 
choices, have those choices constrained by external structures.  
 
Causation cannot always be explained, however, by assuming that history develops 
in a linear fashion. In our comparative account, several lines of causation are 
certainly clear from the pre-emergence to emergence and growth stages. Emergence 
of a meat-type poultry industry, for instance, occurred when entrepreneurs sensed 
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opportunities for expanding production and seeking new markets. Yet structure did 
not determine how those entrepreneurs would approach alliances with major 
retailers. 
 
By contrast with the structural approach to history, the space-of-experience 
metaphor seeks to open up the interior of lived history, the “black box” of change 
over time (Foster et al., 2017). Periodization from this perspective takes on a role as a 
sensemaking tool, a means of enriching understanding, more than a means for 
revealing linear causality in a deterministic sense. In the comparative cases of the 
U.S. and U.K. poultry industries, the periodization that emerges from oral histories 
is rich in details that defy conventional economic logic. The entrepreneurs who built 
the two nations’ poultry industries had, in structural terms, broadly similar 
experiences, but their interpretations of which periods of time were most significant 
for the long-term trajectory of the industries highlighted dramatically different 
understandings of the norms of behavior between industry stakeholders. 
 
The collective memories of poultry entrepreneurs clearly indicate a divergence in 
American and British understandings of the likely consequences of partnering with 
retailers. The generation of American poultry entrepreneurs who made chicken into 
big business in the U.S. shared a common cultural understanding, forged during the 
interwar farm crisis, that poultry production entailed extreme market uncertainty 
and unavoidably combative, hyper-competitive relationships with the mass retailers 
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who provided crucial access to markets. By contrast, the initial preference for a 
collaborative but exclusive network of suppliers expressed by Alan Sainsbury in 
1956 was taken up with alacrity by five poultry entrepreneurs who remembered the 
compulsory cooperation of wartime.  
 
Periodization, as a temporal structuring device for both historians of 
entrepreneurship and for entrepreneurs as constitutive historicists, therefore enables 
an approach to history that navigates between the poles of deterministic causality 
and unconstrained individual agency (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002; Vaara and 
Lamberg, 2016; Wadhwani and Jones, 2014). Our framework, which draws on the 
comparative method to highlight the pitfalls of relying solely on structural 
metaphors to explain historical change, demonstrates the need to listen to 
entrepreneurs rendering their own ideas about the past. Structures develop over 
time and constrain power relations, yet attending to the space of experience of 
historical actors makes clear that entrepreneurs must always make choices, such as 
whether to collaborate with established firms to gain access to markets.  
 
The individual microhistorical founding narratives analyzed above show that the 
entrepreneurs all vividly recalled some key ‘trigger’ event (Vaara and Lamberg, 
2016; Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016b). These triggers, understood as founding events 
in a coherent period of experience from which to draw behavioral lessons in later 
contexts, were different. In the U.S., the triggers centered on individualistic 
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responses to unforeseen problems that then became opportunities. In the U.K., the 
principal trigger was that one of the leading retailers selected individual early stage 
poultry entrepreneurs and offered to collaborate. The historical precedent of the 
shared experience of the enforced wartime collaboration in food supplies provided a 
framework for the alliance partners to understand how to behave as partners, 
reinforced by the fact that almost all the poultry industry pioneers had strong 
military backgrounds (Godley, 2014; Holroyd and Trelford, 1986). There was an 
obvious and powerful shared experience of bonding to give affective support to the 
collective endeavor (Li et al., 2017). 
 
Drawing on a wider range of historical understanding and methodology, including 
the comparative method, therefore offers the ability to open up epistemological 
space for accepting the surprising and the serendipitous at the same time as 
recognizing the constraints of external forces. This article shows how using historical 
methods enables a richer understanding of how entrepreneurs choose to enter into 
strategic alliances, and so contributes to a specific unsettled question in the literature 
on strategic entrepreneurship. But through its more explicit articulation of spatial 
metaphors of historical time, temporal structuring as a means of understanding the 
strategic use of historical time, and exposing the rich possibilities available by 
pursuing comparative methods, the article also contributes to the developing 
theoretical and methodological sophistication among business historians, a 
development which will, we suspect, continue to offer fruitful contributions to 
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contextual entrepreneurship studies. Further research drawing on comparative 
approaches to the space of experience could bring fresh perspectives to significant 
areas of entrepreneurial decision-making, such as modes of internationalization, 
selection of funding sources, or strategies for building reputation, all areas where 
history undoubtedly matters to entrepreneurs but in which entrepreneurship 
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Figure 1: U.S. and U.K. broiler industry output (000s metric tonnes), years after 
initial industry organization 
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Table 1: Concentration in U.S. and U.K. broiler industries, years after initial 
industry organization 
  
Years U.S. Top 4 Market Share (%) U.K. Top 4 Market Share (%) 
1 to 3 <5 <5 
17 to 18 24 48 
Sources: Godley, 2014; Roy, 1966.  
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